Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady

The collapse of the Najibullah regime in Kabul in April 1992 not only ended the communist era in Afghanistan but also heralded the end of Pashtun dominance in Afghan politics. Indeed, for many cornmenta- tors as well as politicians this change in ethnic relations was more significant than the defeat of communism. After briefly discussing the history of ethnic relations in Afghanistan, this essay will describe the decline of the Pashtuns in Afghan politics since April 1992, examine the causes of the decline, and speculate about the future of the nation’s ethnic relations.

The Evolution of Ethnic Relations

Afghanistan is a heterogeneous society of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Aimaqs (constituting about 50%, 26%, 8%, 7%, and 6%, respectively, of the population), and a large number of other much smaller ethnic groups. The Pashtuns established the Afghan state in 1747, and despite the country’s eth- nic heterogeneity, maintained their dominance until 1992. These two-and-a- half centuries can be divided into four periods: (1) the rise and fall of the Durrani empire, 1747-1 8 1 8; (2) the emergence of an ethnically more homo- geneous, but decentralized Afghanistan, 18 1 8-80; (3) the consolidation of the modern Afghan state, 1880-1950s; and (4) the emergence of the nation- state, 1963-92.

The Durrani empire for the first time brought all the Pashtuns under the control of one political center. Pashtun tribal levies constituted the backbone of the empire’s military force, and the state treated the Pashtuns preferentially compared to its other subjects. The Pashtuns were taxed more lightly than others, their tribes, especially the Durranis, were the major recipients of state largess in the distribution of land, and they were the primary beneficiaries of state expenditures. In short, during the Durrani empire, the Pashtuns enjoyed

institutionalized military, political, and economic dominance in Afghanistan. Even after the empire disintegrated, Afghanistan in ethnic terms was a pre- dominantly Pashtun country, but due to intradynastic conflict, the central government had minimal control over the various regions. Nevertheless, in this period the Dwani Pashtuns were the only contenders for power, and in interethnic relations, the military and political dominance of the Pashtuns was indisputable. The emergence of modern Afghanistan during the reign of Abdul Rahrnan Khan (1 880-1 901) had two contradictory consequences for the dominance of the Pashtuns. On the one hand, the Dwand Treaty of 1893 between British India and Afghanistan deprived the latter of control over one-half of the Pashtuns, significantly reducing the size of the Pashtun majority in Afghani- stan; on the other hand, the consolidation of central government power vis-a- vis the provinces, the resettlement of the Pashtuns in the north, and the pacifi- cation of Hazarajat firmly established Pashtun dominance throughout Afghanistan. The assumption of power in Kabul in 1929 by Habibullah, a Tajik, briefly undermined Pashtun dominance until Nader Khan, supported by a Pashtun tribal levy, defeated Habibullah and with his brother, Prime Minister Hashem Khan, firmly reestablished the Pashtun position. After 1946, however, both Prime Ministers Shah Mahmoud and Mohammad Daud attempted to modernize the country rapidly and establish greater equality among its citizens. Serious efforts to build a nation-state based on equality began with the constitutional decade (1964-73). In the 1964 Constitution, no ethnic group was granted any privileges that others did not enjoy. Not only was ethnic equality promoted but the centuries-long discrimination against the Shiite Muslims was also abandoned. Consequently, during this decade, the distribu- tion of elite positions in government also changed in favor of the ethnic mi- norities.l Interethnic relations received primary attention when the communists came to power in 1978. During the reign of the Khalq faction (1978-79) of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the communist authori- ties, in addition to Pashtu and Dari (Persian), recognized Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, and Nooristani as official languages. Although this seemed like an attempt by the Khalq faction to weaken the dominance of the Pashtuns, in reality the policy was intended to weaken the status of Dari and eventually promote Pashtu as the language of interethnic comm~nication.

The Parcham faction of the PDPA, especially during Babrak Kamal’s leadership  (1980-86), tried to exploit ethnic conflict for the purpose of stabilizing its regime. In addition to recognizing six languages as official, the Parchamites recruited a large number of ethnic minorities into the armed forces and the bureaucracy. The Karma1 regime believed that the Pashtuns were the major force behind the resistance to the communist government and wanted to strengthen relations with the min~rities.~ This policy not only drastically re- duced the dominance of the Pashtuns in state institutions but eventually caused the breakdown of the state after the Soviet forces withdrew.

However, while Pashtun dominance in state institutions declined during the 1980s, Pashtun supremacy within the resistance was undisputed. Of the seven major resistance organizations based in Pakistan, six were dominated by the Pashtuns. The Shiite organizations based in Iran did not play an im- portant role during the resistance against the Soviets.

The Decline of the Pashtuns

The Pashtuns have suffered a clear decline since April 1992 when the North- ern Alliance, a coalition of ethnic minorities, overthrew the regime of Presi- dent Najibullah. Probably the strongest evidence of the decline of the Pashtuns is their loss of territorial control; constituting about 50% of the pop- ulation, they now control no more than two-fifths of the country. In terms of military and political control, Afghanistan is now divided into five areas: in the north, Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostam has control over the Faryab, Jozjan, Balkh, Samangan, Baghlan, and (partially) Kunduz provinces; in the northeast, Tajik Commander Ahmad Shah Masud controls the Takhar, Badakhshan, Panvan, Kapisa, and parts of Kunduz provinces; in the center, the Hazara organizations, especially the Hizibi Wahdat, has control over the Bamyan, parts of Ghor, Uruzgan, and Ghazni provinces; in the west, Tajik Commander Ismail Khan controls the Badghis, Herat, and a large part of Ghor and Farah provinces; and ten of the remaining southeastern, southern, and southwestern Pashtun provinces (the largest area) are controlled by the Taliban, a group of Pashtun students of Islamic studies who emerged on the Afghan political scene in October 1994, and a coalition of three Pashtun Is- lamic organizations that control the provinces of Laghman, Nangarhar, and Kunar in the east.

Although the Taliban, who had gained control of ten Pashtun provinces between November 1994 and February 1995, have captured Nimroz Province and parts of Farah Province from Ismail Khan, they have lost some formerly Pashtun-controlled territories in the vicinity of Kabul, a loss that has greater political significance than the success against Ismail Khan. The rise of the Taliban generated optimism among the Pashtuns about a reversal of their decline but the consolidation of Taliban power thus far has been at the ex­pense of other Pashtun organizations or commanders. Non-Pashtuns, who control about three-fifths of the country, not only reject Pashtun dominance but are opposed to the Afghan character of the state as well.

The decline of the Pashtuns in the personnel of state institutions is also very conspicuous. Most units of the old Afghan military disintegrated at the time of the collapse of the communist regime, and the few units that have remained intact are mostly stationed in Kabul and Mazari-Sharif. Although some Pashtun officers still serve in them, these units are controlled by non- Pashtun generals loyal to either Masud or Dostam. Most civilian state institutions have collapsed over the past two years, and whatever state power has survived (e.g., representation in foreign countries, and issuing bank notes) is closely controlled by President Rabbani and Commander Masud, both Tajiks. Similarly, members of the Tajik-dominated political party, Jamiati Islami, dominate whatever is left of the state bureaucracy, including Afghanistan’s diplomatic mission.

The Pashto language also has lost status in the government-controlled me- dia-radio, television, and newspapers. Since the 1920s and before the downfall of the Najibullah regime, the development and popularization of Pashtu received preferential treatment in the government’s cultural policy, or at least equality with Dari, and 50% or more of radio-TV programs were in Pashtu. Since April 1992, Pashtu-language programs have decreased drasti- cally, and the official print media allocates even less space to Pashtu. Thus, although it is difficult to obtain accurate quantitative data to demonstrate the decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, there is abundant qualitative evidence to support the contention, including the observations of both Afghan and for- eign journalist.

Five major factors have been instrumental in the dramatic decline of the Pashtuns. First, the circumstances that led to the collapse of the communist regime in April 1992 facilitated the rise of ethnic minorities. The Karmal faction of the PDPA played an important role in transforming the Afghan conflict from an ideological to an ethnic one. Karmal, a shrewd strategist, realized that without Soviet support the communist regime would collapse, and so after the Soviet withdrawal, to perpetuate his own and his faction’s relevance to Afghan politics, he attempted a new alliance based on ethnic affiliations. Karmal and his associates sought an alliance between non-Pashtun resistance commanders and non-Pashtun communist military officers and bureaucrats. Thus, since 1989 ethnic animosity within the PDPA especially among the leaders has become very intense.’

In this game of elites cultivating ethnic conflict to advance their own polit- ical objectives, the Pashtuns suffered from a disadvantage. They were domi- nant in the Khalq faction and prominent in the Parcham faction of the PDPA and, although the Khalqis lost political leadership to the Parchamites after the Soviet invasion, they remained dominant in the armed forces. As ethnic con- flict intensified after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, a number of promi- nent pro-Pashtun Khalqis (e.g., Defense Minister Shah Nawaz Tani) reached an understanding with the leader of the Pashtun-dominated Hizbi Islami resistance group, Gulbuddin Hekrnatyar, and attempted a military coup against Najibullah’s government in March 1990. The coup failed, and conse- quently, a large number of Pashtun Khalqis lost their positions in the armed forces. This occurred at a very unfortunate juncture for the Pashtuns because Najibullah, himself a Pashtun, could not now trust many of the remaining Pashtun military officers, and he promoted some non-Pashtun Parchamite generals to rather sensitive positions. Some of these officers were en­couraged by the Karmal faction of the PDPA to form an anti-Pashtun alliance with non-Pashtun mujahideen commanders. Finally, when Najibullah real- ized that, at the elite level, the Afghan war was being transformed into an ethnic conflict and tried to put Pashtun generals in charge of important mili- tary units, it was too late. By the end of 1991, the Uzbek general, Dostam, and the Tajik general, Abdul Momen, refused to obey Najibullah’s orderse.

Meanwhile the United Nations’ peace plan for Afghanistan was progress- ing rapidly. By early 1992, Najibullah had agreed to step down and transfer power to an interim administration of neutral technocrats. Subsequently, a U.N.-organized gathering of prominent Afghans was held to elect an interim government, and the Pakistan-based resistance organizations, six of whom were dominated by the Pashtuns, played an important role in this plan. Non- Pashtun mujahideen commanders such as Ahmad Shah Masud believed that the U.N. process had unduly marginalized the field commanders, and they were also apprehensive that the U.N. peace formula would reinstate Pashtun dominance in post-communist Afghanistan. Thus, Masud formed the North- em Alliance with the Hazara leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, the Uzbek General Dostam, and the leader of the Ismaili sect, Jaffer Naderi, to overthrow the Najibullah regime and prevent the implementation of the peace plan. Masud’s new alliance was quickly joined by the anti-Pashtun elements of the ruling Parcham faction of the PDPA.

Some of these very important non-Pashtun military officers allowed Masud to take control in Kabul over most of the government’s military equipment and weapons, including a large number of military aircraft. Similarly, in the north, General Dostam took over most of the weapons and equipment of the Afghan army and the air force. Since the mid- 1980s, the communist regime had kept a large stockpile of weapons in Mazari-Sharif in preparation for eventually losing power in Kabul and establishing their authority in the north. Although some military units in Kabul defected to the Pashtun-dominated Hizbi Islami, and those units that were stationed in Pashtun areas transferred their weapons to Pashtun commanders, a great many more weapons came under Masud’s and Dostam’s control. Thus, the chaotic downfall of the com- munist regime enabled the ethnic minorities to gain military superiority over the Pashtuns.

A second factor contributing to the Pashtuns’ decline was their own divi- sions and rivalries. As noted, six of the seven Pakistan-based resistance orga- nizations were dominated by Pashtuns, and while this multiplicity of organizations during the war against the Soviets enabled the Pashtuns to re- ceive more than their fair share of foreign military and financial aid,9 it also promoted rivalry, suspicion, and frequently violent clashes between them. This intra-Pashtun conflict prevented the leaders of Pashtun-dominated orga- nizations to coordinate their military activities and take a united political stand during the chaotic downfall of the communist regime. For instance, in the past two years the leader of the pro-Saudi Etehadi Islami Pashtun resist- ance group, Abdul-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, has been supporting the Tajik Presi- dent Rabbani against Hekrnatyar. Similarly, for a while Sayed Ahmad Gailani and Mawlawi Mohamed Nabi Mohammadi, the leaders of two other Pashtun resistance organizations, supported Rabbani against Hekmatyar for a time but now oppose both of them. And Mawlawi Mohammad Yunis Khalis’ Pashtun group is engaged in intense competition for power with the support- ers of Hekmatyar in Nangarhar.

In contrast, the ethnic minorities have not had multiple politico-military organizations competing for their support. The Jarniati-Islami is still the only organization dominated by the Tajiks. Although the Hazaras, like the Pash- tuns, were divided into a number of groups after the Soviet withdrawal, Iran pressured them to unite into one organization, the Hizbi Wahdat. This unity was instrumental for Hazara success after the collapse of the communist re- gime. The Uzbeks did not have their own political organization until General Dostam defected from the Najibullah regime and, with his control over the northern provinces, became the self-appointed spokesman for the rights of the Uzbeks in Afghanistan. The Uzbeks seem to enjoy their dominance in the north, and thus are supportive of Dostam.

Third, the gap between the Pashtun resistance leaders and the Pashtun masses also weakened the ethnic group’s position. The overwhelming major- ity of the Pashtuns supported the leadership of ex-King Zahir Shah but he was opposed by the more powerful Pashtun resistance leaders and their for- eign supporters, creating a dangerous gap between the so-called leaders and the people. For instance, since the communist regime’s collapse, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is considered the leader of the Pashtuns; yet, although militarily the strongest, he is quite unpopular among the masses, which has hurt them in their struggle for dominance in Afghanistan.

Fourth, negative Western, especially American attitudes toward Hekmatyar and, by association, the Pashtuns have also hurt the group’s position. The Pashtun-dominated Hizbi Islami, led by Hekmatyar, was the most successful Afghan fundamentalist organization with the strongest ties to radical interna- tional Islamic groups. While these international connections helped the Hizb to acquire more resources and prestige than its Afghan competitors, they had a negative impact on its relations with the West in general and the U.S. in particular. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. believes that revolutionary Is- lamic fundamentalism poses the most serious threat to American interests in West Asia, and that Hekmatyar’s Hizbi Islami was its most dangerous bastion in Afghanistan. Thus, soon after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989, the United States sought to weaken Hekmatyar and his organization by indi- rectly supporting the Rabbani-Masud bid for power, hoping that they would quickly gain control over the entire country, neutralize Hekmatyar’s fimda- mentalist threat, and thus help stabilize the region.1° Of course, the U.S. stand weakened the Pashtuns’ position. The American position on Afghani- stan changed in March 1994 when the United States encouraged the United Nations to resume its peace-making efforts. Currently, the U.S. does not sup- port the Rabbani government, and there have been rumors that it is indirectly supporting the Taliban, who oppose that govenzment. Finally, the struggle for influence in Afghanistan among regional powers has also hurt the Pashtuns. After the Cold War ended and Soviet forces with- drew from Afghanistan, American and Soviet interest in the country declined while competition for influence among regional powers intensified.” In 1992 each regional power supported certain ethnic groups in Afghanistan; Iran supported the Hazaras and, for a while, the Tajiks; Uzbekistan and Tur- key the Uzbeks; and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan the Pashtuns. Saudi support for the Pashtuns in general and Hekmatyar in particular was due both to the fundamentalist orientation of the Hizbi Islami and its opposition to the expan- sion of Iranian influence in Afghanistan. However, this support for the Pash- tuns and Hekmatyar weakened in late 1992 when the Rabbani and Masud relationship with Iran deteriorated. l2 Pakistan’s support was also due to Hekmatyar’s Islamist orientation and his opposition, in contrast to the position advocated by various Afghan gov- ernments since 1947, to the right of self-determination for the ten million Pashtuns living in Pakistan. However, as the civil war in Afghanistan as- sumed ethnic character in 1992, Pakistan’s policy became rather incoherent. On the one hand, it had the closest ties with the Pashtun organizations, espe- cially Hekmatyar’s, and wanted these Pashtun Islamists to assume power in Afghanistan; on the other, thinking of its own Pashtun population, it did not want these organizations to advocate Pashtun nationalism.13 Consequently, while other regional powers were quite enthusiastic in their support of their allies in Afghanistan, Pakistan was rather indecisive about its preferences. The 1993 change of government in Pakistan has made its policy in Af- ghanistan even more confusing. While former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif continued his predecessors’ policies of support for Hekmatyar over other Af- ghan competitors, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has tried to distance her government from Hekmatyar. Indeed, a number of reports indicate that Paki- stan’s assistance was instrumental in the Taliban’s victory over Hekmatyar.

Although the Taliban have brought most of the Pashtun provinces under one administration, which in the long run is likely to help the Pashtuns in their struggle for power, the Taliban up to now have not been able to reverse the Pashtuns’ decline vis-8-vis other ethnic groups.

The Future of Ethnic Relations

Whether the Pashtuns will be able to regain their dominance or suffer even further marginalization depends on whether Afghanistan will disintegrate or survive its current crisis territorially intact. Since the collapse of the commu- nist regime in April 1992, the country has been moving toward disintegration. Six provinces in the north are under the control of General Dostam, who does not take orders from Kabul, and for all practical purposes, the north now enjoys de facto autonomy. In the west, Ismail Khan has control over four provinces, and although he is an ally of Rabbani, he is not subordinate to Kabul either. The Hazarajat has had de facto autonomy since 1992. Nor does Kabul have any authority over the Pashtun-populated provinces in the southeast, south, and southwest.14 If Afghanistan disintegrates along ethnic lines, the Pashtuns will form an ethnically homogeneous state south of the Hindu Kush either independently or united with the Pashtuns of Pakistan. The Hazaras also might form their own state in Hazarajat. The Tajiks, the Uzbeks, and the Turkomens may either establish separate entities or join Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, respectively.

However, formal disintegration of the state is unlikely because of both do- mestic and international factors. Internally, the Tajiks and the Pashtuns, who together constitute over 75% of the population, are spread throughout the country. No single Tajik entity or union with Tajikistan can bring all Tajiks together. Similarly, although historically the Pashtun’s homeland is south of the Hindu Kush, they have significant presence north of it as well. Indeed, before the anti-Soviet Basmachi rebellion of the 1920s in Central Asia, which resulted in a large influx of Uzbek refugees into northern Afghanistan, the Pashtuns outnumbered the Uzbeks in the north. Thus, disintegration along ethnic lines would be quite difficult,15 and perhaps it is this realization that has prevented any ethnic group from demanding secession; rather, the groups have asked for a federal solution to ethnic conflict. However, in the past year even demands for federalism have died down, and the leaders of various eth- nic minorities have called for national unity in Afghanistan.

The international environment is not conducive to formal dissolution either. With few exceptions, the international system has been very resistant to sanctioning the dissolution of internationally recognized modern nation- states. For this to occur in Afghanistan would establish a dangerous prece- dent with unpleasant consequences for all nations in the region. India, Iran, Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics are all ethnically heterogeneous societies, and the disintegration of Afghanistan along ethnic lines would probably have a de-stabilizing impact on all of them, which is why Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and Iran have rejected any such formal move. Thus, it is unlikely that Afghanistan will experience formal dissolution. The two more realistic alternatives are either the continuation of the current state of anarchy and de facto disintegration, or the reconstitution of a central government.

For a number of reasons, the current state of anarchy cannot continue in- definitely. First, continuing warfare will prevent the return of refugees from Iran and Pakistan, and their return has been a major objective of both coun- tries as dwindling assistance for refugees imposes a heavy burden on them. Since 1993, Iran has forced a large number of Afghan refugees to return home,16 but ongoing civil war makes it very difficult to create conditions conducive for returning all of them. Thus, it is highly likely that both Iran and Pakistan will press for the resolution of the Afghan conflict.

Second, 16 years of warfare has seriously crippled the Afghan economy. Continued fighting is bound to result in the elimination of all surplus produc- tion, and with a subsistence domestic economy, the warring factions will have to depend totally on foreign aid. Although foreign material support for contenders in the civil war in the past has been abundant, the continuation of a long military and political stalemate is likely to force the foreign backers of the various Afghan groups to reconsider their policies. Discontinuation of foreign aid will expedite the end of the civil war.

Third, anarchy in Afghanistan can be exploited by international terrorists. The West is already concerned about links between international Islamic ter- rorists and certain groups in Afghanistan,17 and although this is not a prob- lem requiring immediate action, it is bound to receive greater attention in the future. Ending the chaos in Afghanistan would likely have a negative impact on Islamic terrorism. Concern about international terrorist activity seems to be a major motivation behind U.S. support for the resumption of U.N. peace- making efforts in Afghanistan.

And fourth, the breakdown of the state and collapse of the normal econ- omy are the major reasons for the dramatic increase in narcotics production in Afghanistan, which is either the number one or number two supplier of narcotics to Western markets. As drugs became a major social and political issue in the West, governments began to pay as much attention to supply sources abroad as to drug distribution at home, and ending the anarchy in Afghanistan would be a tremendous help in controlling the trade.18 As with terrorism, the drug issue is also a major reason why the U.S. supports the current U.N. peace efforts in Afghanistan. The above factors may not require immediate intense attention, but they will encourage both regional powers and the West eventually to press for an end to the anarchy. Consequently, it is quite likely that Afghanistan will survive the current crisis without dis- memberment.

If Afghanistan remains territorially intact, the Pashtuns, because of sheer numbers, are likely to reverse their current decline and regain dominance in Afghan politics. There are various estimates of the Pashtun population in Afghanistan; some claim it to be as low as 40% of the total, while others believe that it exceeds 60%. Without a reliable census it is difficult to deter- mine the exact percentage, but most sources use the 50%-55% estimate as the most likely.19 In an era when ethnic majorities everywhere are becoming dominant, it is highly unrealistic that, on a long term basis, the Pashtuns can be denied noninstitutionalized (de facto) dominance in Afghanistan. Further, the Pashtuns are likely to rebound because the causes of their decline are temporary; for instance, disunity among them played an important role in their decline, but with the rise of the Taliban, Pashtun unity has strengthened significantly.

Moreover, the minorities in Afghanistan do not have a strong common denominator that would enable them to form a lasting alliance against the Pashtuns. Historically, Uzbek-Hazara animosity has been as strong as that between the Pashtuns and Hazaras. Similarly, the Uzbeks and the Tajiks have a history of unfriendly relations, both in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The experiences of the past two years lend credence to this analysis. The dramatic decline of the Pashtuns began with the formation of the Northern Alliance, but that alliance collapsed in less than a year. The Hazaras and the Tajiks fought each other in Kabul as early as August 1992, and in 1993 the

Uzbeks also abandoned their alliance with the Tajiks. Indeed, since early 1994, General Dostam (Uzbek) and Abdul Ali Mazari (Hazara) have been allied with the Pashtun Hekmatyar against Masud and Rabbani (Tajiks). Fur- thermore, some minorities such as the Nooristanis, the Pashais, the Brahus, and the Baluchs have always been closer to the Pashtuns than other ethnic groups. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the minorities will be able to form a durable coalition with support from at least half of the population. Conse- quently, the Pashtuns as the largest ethnic group are likely to regain their de facto dominance if Afghanistan does not disintegrate into a number of sepa- rate ethnic entities.

But, a reconstituted Afghanistan will have to establish ethnic relations on a clear and solid foundation; the issues of equality and identity must be ad- dressed seriously. The minorities usually complain that they have been the victims of cultural, economic, and political discrimination, which was true prior to World War Two. But since then, the minorities have not provided convincing evidence to support claims of discrimination. Islam provides the general cultural framework for all ethnic groups in Afghanistan. What distin- guishes the Pashtuns from other Muslim Afghans is their pre-Islamic code of behavior-the Pashtunwali. Although the Pashtunwali still constitutes a large part of Pashtun culture, the government has never encouraged its en- forcement in non-Pashtun communities. Indeed, since the 1880s, the govern- ment has supported the Islamic Sharia against the Pashtunwali even in Pashtun areas.

Since there is no systematic study of wealth distribution in Afghanistan, the minorities claim of economic discrimination can neither be rejected nor confirmed. However, since land is the major means of production, the distri- bution of land ownership may shed some light on the issue of wealth distribu- tion too. Unlike other West Asian and South Asian countries, according to Dupree, the distribution of land in Afghanistan was quite equal even before the 1978 revolution. Dupree estimated that 60% of all farmland was owner- operated and that only 30 individuals in the entire country owned more than 1,000 jiribs (roughly equal to an acre).20 The Soviet scholar Glukhoded and the Indian scholar Mukherjie, using Afghan government statistics and other sources in 1978, compiled relatively systematic and probably the most recent and reliable data on land distribution in Afghanistan. Their estimates show that while 42% of Afghan families owned one to six hectares of land, more than 75% owned some land. Mukherjie’s and Glukhoded’s data, respec- tively, indicate that 9% and 4% of the families owned over 40% of the private available land. However, the average holding of even land-rich families was estimated at 15 to 18 hectares, which is quite small compared to land concen-

Pakistan, and India.21 Thus, it is not certain that the Pashtuns owned a greatly disproportionate amount of land, and even if they did, the land reform programs of the second Daud administration and the PDPA would have redistributed land to the peasants. The most persistent complaint by the minorities, however, is that the Pash- tuns have in the past almost monopolized elite positions in government. A recent study, however, indicates that during the old regime (before 1963), the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, the Sayyids, and other ethnic groups accounted for 57.9%, 29.2%, 6.4%, and 4.5%, respectively, of the political elites in Afghan- istan. During the constitutional decade (1964-73), this composition changed to 56.1% Pashtuns, 33% Tajiks, 3.3% Sayyids, and 5.5% other Sunni ethnic groups. Both the Pashtuns and the Tajiks were over-represented, but only marginally. The over-representation of the Sayyids was more serious, and the Shiites in general and the Hazaras in particular were seriously under- represented. The Shiites make up about 15% of the population, but they ac- counted for only about 1.8% and 2.2% of political elites during the old re- gime and the constitutional decade, respectively. Thus, with the exception of the Shiites, and especially the Hazaras, the claims of other minorities of polit- ical discrimination is not supported by evidence. Indeed, during the constitutional decade, while the Pashtuns’ over-representation in elite positions declined, the Tajiks’ over-representation increased by 3%. Afghans should not confuse historic injustice with existing inequalities. Historically, not only were ethnic minorities discriminated against, but even non-Durrani Pashtuns, especially the Ghilzais, were also the victims of dis- crimination. However, from the end of World War Two, and especially from 1963 until the socialist revolution of 1978, various governments in Afghanistan tried hard to build a national community based on the equality of all citizens. Of course, legal equality does not guarantee equality in the society, and probably a more practical approach to social justice is to pursue equality of opportunity. The Afghans need to build a national community based on the equality of all citizens under the law and equality of opportunity in the distribution of resources. Minorities demanding justice must identify concrete instances of legal inequalities and barriers to equal opportunity for all. Pashtun unhappiness stems from the attitude of the minorities regarding the identity of the state. The Pashtuns believe that they constitute the majority in Afghanistan, that the Afghan state was formed by the Pashtuns, that Afghanistan is the only Pashtun state in the world, and that the minorities

should accept the Afghan character of the state. Most other ethnic groups in the region have their own state. No ethnic minority can seriously question the Persian character of Iran, the Turkish character of Turkey, the Tajik character of Tajikistan, and the Uzbek character of Uzbekistan. The Pashtuns argue that the same should hold for Afghanistan.

The Pashtuns believe that in their relations with ethnic minorities they have been more tolerant than others in the region, who in their own states enforce the dominance of their own languages. Although some Pashtuns believe that Pashtu should have the same status in Afghanistan, many are also willing to accept Dari as an official language provided that Pashtu is granted a symbolic preference. However, when the Pashtuns demand the dominance of Pashtu and the Afghan character of the state, they are accused of fascism and oppression of minorities. They feel that minority demands for a federal structure is a disguised attempt to reject the Afghan identity of the country and promote ethnic separation. If the motivation for federalism were the promotion of regional and local decision-making on provincial issues, the Pashtuns might have accepted it, but if the objective is to strengthen minority identities and weaken the Afghan character of the state, the Pashtuns’ sensitivity to federal- ism is understandable.

Although in the past year the intensity of ethnic conflict has declined significantly, ethnic relations are still problematic and a postwar Afghanistan must deal with that problem. Unless the two issues of legal equality and equality of opportunity for all its citizens and acceptance of the Afghan identity of the country and the state are dealt with openly and resolved satisfactorily, political stability will elude Afghanistan.